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MEDIA LIABILITY FOR LIBEL OF NEWSWORTHY PERSONS:
BEFORE AND AFTER TIME, INC. V. FIRESTONE
In 1964, Mary Firestone filed a complaint in the Circuit Court
for Palm Beach County, Florida, seeking separate maintenance.' Her
husband, the scion of a wealthy family, counterclaimed for divorce,
alleging extreme cruelty and adultery.2 The trial court granted the
counterclaim but based its decision on the ground that "neither party
[was] domesticated.' Time Magazine's editorial staff, headquartered
in New York was alerted by a wire-service report and by an account in
a New York newspaper that a judgment had been rendered in the
Firestone divorce proceeding. Further information regarding the
1. Time Inc. v. Firestone, 424 U.S. 448, 450 (1976).
2. Id.
3. 424 U.S. at 450-51. The Florida circuit court's final judgment, as edited by the
Firestone Court, reads as follows:
"This cause came on for final hearing before the court upon the plaintiff
wife's second amended complaint for separate maintenance (alimony unconnected
with the causes of divorce), the defendant husband's answer and counterclaim
for divorce on grounds of extreme cruelty and adultery, and the wife's answer
thereto setting up certain affirmative defenses ...
"According to certain testimony in behalf of the defendant, extramarital
escapades of the plaintiff were bizarre and of an amatory nature which would
have made Dr. Freud's hair curl. Other testimony, in plaintiff's behalf, would
indicate that defendant was guilty of bounding from one bedpartner to another
with the erotic zest of a satyr. The court is inclined to-discount much of this
testimony as unreliable. Nevertheless, it is the conclusion and finding of the
court that neither party is domesticated, within the meaning of that term as used
by the Supreme Court of Florida ....
"In the present case, it is abundantly clear from the evidence of marital
discord that neither of the parties has shown the least susceptibility to domestica-
tion, and that the marriage should be dissolved.
"The premises considered, it is thereupon
"ORDERED AND ADJUDGED as follows:
"1. That the equities in this cause are with the defendant; that defendant's
counterclaim for divorce be and the same is hereby granted, and the bonds of
matrimony which have heretofore existed between the parties are hereby
forever dissolved.
"4. That the defendant shall pay unto the plaintiff the sum of $3,000 per
month as alimony beginning January 1, 1968, and a like sum on the first day
of each and every month thereafter until the death or remarriage of the
plaintiff."
Subsequent to this order of the circuit court, the Florida Supreme Court in Firestone
v. Firestone, 263 So. 2d 223, 225 (Fla. 1972), pointed out that "lack of domestication"
is not a proper ground for divorce in Florida. The court affirmed the decree of divorce,
however, stating that there was sufficient evidence to sustain a finding of "extreme
cruelty." Id.
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Florida decision was later received from a bureau chief and from a
"stringer." 4 On the basis of these four sources, Time's staff composed
the following item, which was published in the magazine's "Milestones"
section:
DIVORCED. By Russell A. Firestone Jr., 41, heir to the tire
fortune: Mary Alice Sullivan Firestone, 32, his third wife; a one-
time Palm Beach schoolteacher; on grounds of extreme cruelty and
adultery;5 after six years of marriage, one son; in West Palm Beach,
Fla. The 17-month intermittent trial produced enough testimony
of extramarital adventures on both sides, said the judge, "to make
Dr. Freud's hair curl."6
Ms. Firestone demanded a retraction, alleging that a portion of
the article was "false, malicious, and defamatory," in that the divorce
was not granted on the grounds of adultery. 7 Time refused to oblige.8
Ms. Firestone then brought a libel action in the state court. The
4. Id. Time did not consider the stringer to be its employee. His work for Time
was done on a part-time basis; he was paid at an hourly rate; and he was guaranteed
a minimum amount of work each year. Id. at 468 n.7 (Powell, J., concurring).
5. An analysis revealing this inaccuracy was offered by the Florida Supreme Court
in Firestone v. Time, Inc., 305 So. 2d 172 (Fla. 1974):
Pursuant to Florida law in effect at the time of the divorce judgment (Section
61.08, Florida Statutes), a wife found guilty of adultery could not be awarded
alimony. Since petitioner had been awarded alimony, she had not been found
guilty of adultery nor had the divorce been granted on the ground of adultery.
A careful examination of the final decree prior to publication would have clearly
demonstrated that the divorce had been granted on the grounds of extreme
cruelty, and thus the wife would have been saved the humiliation of being accused
of adultery in a nationwide magazine.
Id. at 178 (emphasis added). In other words, the only way for Time to decipher the
trial court's order and arrive at the conclusion that adultery was not a ground for the
divorce was through a fair degree of familiarity with the Florida divorce laws. How-
ever, as indicated in note 3 supra, even a familiarity with these laws did not prevent
the trial judge from arriving at his own incorrect ground for the divorcel Yet the
Florida Supreme Court found that Time's article was "a flagrant example of journalistic
negligence." 305 So. 2d at 178.
6. 424 U.S. at 452. This part of the "Milestone" is not strictly accurate. The trial
court's order stated that only the plaintiff-wife's extramarital escapades "were bizarre
and of an. amatory nature which would have made Dr. Freud's hair curl." The order
added, however, that "[o]ther testimony, in plaintiff's behalf, would indicate that
defendant-husband was guilty of bounding from one bedpartner to another with the
erotic zest of a satyr. The court is inclined to discount much of this testimony as un-
reliable." See note 3 supra.
7. Id.
8. Id. The Supreme Court noted that "[u]nder Florida law the demand for re-
traction was a prerequisite for filing a libel action, and permits defendants to limit
their potential liability to actual damages by complying with the demand. FLA. STAT.
ANN. §§ 770.01-770.02 (1963)." 424 U.S. at 452 n.l.
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Florida Supreme Court ultimately affirmed a jury verdict for Ms.
Firestone, awarding actual damages of $100,000.' The United States
Supreme Court granted certiorari to review Time's claim that the
Florida judgment violated the magazine's rights under the first and
fourteenth amendments to the United States Constitution. °
Time urged that the "actual malice" test, as adopted in New York
Times Co. v. Sullivan," should apply to all reports of judicial pro-
ceedings. In any event, Time argued, the test should apply because
the plaintiff, Ms. Firestone, was a "public figure," as defined in Gertz
v. Robert Welch, Inc.' 2 A divided Court 13 rejected Time's arguments
and held that the actual malice test was inapplicable' 4 The Court
found that Ms. Firestone was not a "public figure' ' 1 5 and that Time's
request for an extension of the New York Times actual malice rule
to all reports of judicial proceedings "prove[d] too much."' 6 The Court
did, however, remand the case since the Court could not ascertain
from the record whether there had been a finding of any fault-negli-
gent or otherwise-on Time's part in the publication of the defama-
tory material.
1 7
9. Id. at 452; Firestone v. Time, Inc., 305 So. 2d 172 (Fla. 1974), vacated and re-
manded, 424 U.S. 448 (1976).
10. 421 U.S. 909 (1975). Time claimed that the refusal by the Florida Supreme
Court to require Ms. Firestone to prove "actual malice," as defined in New York Times
Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964), before imposing liability, violated Time's right to
free expression. Time v. Firestone, 424 U.S. at 452-53. The actual malice test requires
that a plaintiff prove that an alleged defamatory statement was published "with
knowledge that it was false or with reckless disregard of whether it was false or not."
New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279-80 (1964).
11. 376 U.S. 254 (1964); see note 10 supra. The New York Times Court held the
actual malice test applicable to cases in which the plaintiff is a public official. 376 U.S.
at 283.
12. 418 U.S. 323, 345 (1974).
13. Justice Rehnquist delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Chief Justice
Burger, and Justices Stewart, Blackmun, and Powell joined. Justice Powell also filed a
concurring opinion in which Justice Stewart joined. Justices Brennan, White, and Marshall
filed separate dissenting opinions. Justice Stevens took no part in the consideration or
decision of the case.
14. 424 U.S. at 453.
15. Id.
16. Id. at 455. The Court also rejected Time's contention that its "Milestones" item
was factually correct. The Court observed that this very issue had been submitted to
and resolved by the jury, and that the jury's conclusion that the item was incorrect
had "ample support." Id. at 458.
17. Id. at 461-64. A finding of fault is mandated by Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc.,
418 U.S. 323 (1974), before any plaintiff can recover damages against a publisher for
defamation. The Firestone Court noted that it was unwilling to "canvass the record to
make such a determination [of fault] in the first instance." Id. at 464. On remand the
Florida Supreme Court vacated the decision of the Fourth District Court of Appeal,
appearing at 279 So. 2d 389, "with directions to the District Court to vacate the judg-
ment of the trial court and for further proceedings in the trial court not inconsistent
MEDIA LIABILITY
Although libel law originated as an alternative to breach of the
peace by persons resorting to self-help in defense of their honor, no
longer is this its primary purpose. Now the libel action is intended to
provide a means of redressing unfair damage to reputation.18 The
law of libel in the United States has evolved out of a conflict between
two opposing policies: the fundamental belief in freedom of expres-
sion has collided with sympathy for the defamed victim and indigna-
tion at the maligning tongue.19 In balancing these interests, the law
of libel exerts pressure on the news media to censor itself in at least
three ways. First, the law can provide for the award of punitive dam-
ages.20 Second, the law can presume damages from the mere fact of
publication without proof of actual damage. 21 Third, the law can
employ an uncertain or overly broad standard of liability or permit
recovery by an inappropriately wide class of plaintiffs. 22
Conscious of these three pressures, the United States Supreme
Court has striven to formulate a system of tests which accommodate
the competing interests of the individual and society. In a series of
with the decision by the Supreme Court of the United States . . . ." Firestone v.
Time, Inc., 332 So. 2d 68 (Fla. 1976).
18. T.I. EMERSON, THE SYSTEM OF FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION 518 (1970).
19. W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 111, at 737 (4th ed. 1971).
20. Saunders Hardware Five and Ten, Inc. v. Low, 307 So. 2d 893 (Fla. 3d Dist.
Ct. App. 1975).
21. Id. But see Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Brown, 66 So. 2d 679 (Fla. 1953).
Indeed, without the protection of a constitutional or other privilege, the general rule
of libel was that all libelous matter was actionable without allegation and proof of
special damage. "The practical result is that the jury may award not only nominal
damages, but substantial sums in compensation of the supposed harm to the plaintiff's
reputation, without any proof that it has in fact occurred. This is the accepted rule in
England ...." W. PROSSER, supra note 19, § 112, at 762 (footnote omitted). American
courts have modified this rule somewhat. If extrinsic facts are necessary to make out
the defamatory meaning, the rules relating to slander apply.
If the imputation falls into one of the four special slander categories [imputation
of: a crime involving moral turpitude; unchastity of a woman; affliction with a
loathsome disease; or unfitness of the plaintiff in his business, employment, or
office], it is actionable without proof of special damage. If it does not, there
can be no recovery unless special damages are pleaded and proved.
Id. at 763 (footnotes omitted). This last category is known as libel per quod. See Ausness,
Libel Per Quod in Florida, 23 U. FLA. L. REv. 51 (1971).
The special damage required is specific pecuniary loss, proximately resulting
from the published matter, such as loss of a particular customer, employment,
contract, credit, marriage, election, etc., which must be both pleaded and es-
tablished with particularity. Unless the defamed person is able to sustain the
onerous burden, when applicable, a cause of action cannot be made out. In
effect, so far as the preponderance of defamatory matter is concerned, the
existence of a remedy depends upon whether special damages is required or
not.
Hern, Libel-by-Extrinsic-Fact, 47 CORNELL L.Q. 14, 17 (1961).
22. See New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 277-84, 292 (1964).
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cases since the landmark decision of New York Times Co. v. Sullivan
in 1964, the Supreme Court has struggled to produce a doctrine en-
compassing a system of clear and workable liability standards and to
regulate the recovery of damages in those cases implicating the press.
Nevertheless, the press now finds itself burdened with ambiguous and
uncertain guidelines. Actual damages under these standards may
amount to little more than the presumed damages of the common law.23
This note will trace the origins and development of the present Su-
preme Court doctrine from its inception in New York Times Co. v.
Sullivan through the instant case of Time, Inc. v. Firestone. An analysis
of the frequent shifts in the Court's standards for libel demonstrates
an uncertainty which may encourage spurious litigation (with its con-
comitant costs) in pursuit of potentially large damage awards.
In attempting to protect the first amendment activities of the press,
the states had developed a series of partial or total privileges which
insulated the press from liability in an action for libel. By 1964, a
qualified privilege of "fair comment" had evolved in a majority of
states which permitted all members of society to offer any comment,
criticism, or opinion concerning any public figure or public issue,
provided the statement was a bona fide expression of opinion and not
made with the motive of causing harm.2 4 A minority of states had
extended this fair-comment privilege to good-faith misstatements of
fact as well.2 1 Likewise, an absolute privilege had developed in state
libel law to insulate the publication of defamatory statements occurr-
ing during judicial proceedings, legislative proceedings, communica-
tions between husband and wife, conduct to which the plaintiff had
given consent, and executive communications .2  However, this de-
velopment of state libel law had remained substantially unaffected by
federal constitutional guidelines.
23. See note 21 supra.
24. See Note, Recent Developments Concerning Constitutional Limitations on
State Defamation Laws, 18 VA"D. L. REv. 1429, 1435-36 (1965) and cases cited therein.
25. Id. at.1436.
26. An absolute privilege provides complete immunity even if bad faith and
knowledge can be demonstrated. W. PROSSER, supra note 19, § 114, at 776. In Barr v.
Matteo, 360 U.S. 564 (1959), the Supreme Court extended the absolute privilege to all
federal personnel who utter defamatory statements within the "outer perimeter" of
their "line of duty." Id. at 575. One oft-repeated rationale for the Court's refusal to
extend first amendment absolute privilege to statements made by the press may be
found in Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 75 (1964), quoting Chaplinsky v. New Hamp-
shire,. 315 U.S. 568, 572 (1942). Justice Brennan wrote that bad-faith misstatements of
fact :"fall into that class of utterances which 'are no essential part of any exposition
of ideas, and are of such slight social value as a step to truth that any benefit that
may be derived from them is clearly outweighed by the social interest in order and
morality.... .
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Then, in New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, the United States Su-
preme Court outlined federal constitutional requirements which must
be met before a public official can recover damages for libel by news
media. In that case, a city commissioner sued the New York Times for
defamatory publication of a paid advertisement that falsely described
police treatment of civil-rights protestors in Montgomery, Alabama.
Sullivan claimed the advertisement referred to him-even though it
did not name him-because his responsibilities as commissioner in-
cluded supervision of the police department. In an opinion by Justice
Brennan, the Court held that a public official could recover damages27
for defamation relating to his official conduct only if he proved clearly
and convincingly that the statement in question was made with " 'actual
malice'-that is, with knowledge that it was false or with reckless dis-
regard of whether it was false or not."s
The rationale underlying the Court's decision encompassed two
basic considerations: first, the Court noted that cases involving claims
of news media defamation must be considered "against the back-
ground of a profound national commitment to the principle that
debate on public issues should be uninhibited, robust, and wide-
open . . . ,"21 And second, the Court observed that "erroneous state-
ment is inevitable in free debate . . . ."0 Therefore, in order to pro-
vide freedom of expression with the "breathing space" it needs "to
survive," the Court held that the erroneous statement must be pro-
tected.31 The New York Times Court found that to afford the press
with less protection than that provided by the actual malice test
would present a serious threat of press self-censorship.32 Three con-
curring justices33 argued that first amendment interests required the
27. The Court apparently permits recovery of punitive damages under the "actual
malice" standard. However, as will be discussed later, given the potentially large re-
coveries for "actual damages" which can now be obtained by private litigants, the
threat of punitive damages would appear to be a purely superfluous pressure.
28. 376 U.S. at 279-80. The Court illuminated the concept of "reckless disregard"
in St. Amant v. Thompson, 390 U.S. 727 (1968). The Court indicated that "reckless
disregard" would be present where "the publisher was aware of the likelihood that
he was circulating false information" or where the publisher "in fact entertained
serious doubts as to the truth of his publication." Id. at 730-31 (citations omitted).
Quoting Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 74 (1964), the Court stated that it was
necessary for a plaintiff to show "that a false publication was made with a 'high degree
of awareness of ... probable falsity.'" Id.
29. 379 U.S. at 270.
30. ld. at 271.
31. Id. at 272, quoting NAACP v. Button, 371 US. 415, 433 (1963).
32. Id. at 279. Justice Brennan stated, "A rule compelling the critics of official
conduct to guarantee the truth of all his factual assertions-and to do so on pain of
libel judgments virtually unlimited in amount-leads to . . . 'self-censorship.'" Id.
33. Justices Black, Douglas, and Goldberg. Id. at 293 (Black, Douglas, JJ., con-
curring), 297 (Goldberg, Douglas, JJ., concurring).
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further protection of an absolute privilege-a position doggedly main-
tained by a minority in later cases.3 4
In 1967, in Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts,3 5 a closely divided
court 6 extended the New York Times privilege to require that all
public figures (as well as public officials) meet the actual malice test
before imposing a liability on the press for defamation. Justice Harlan,
joined by three other justices, noted that both of the plaintiffs, either
because of social prominence or purposeful involvement in important
public controversy, were able to command access to the news media
to expose the falsity of defamatory statements, like public officials.3 7
Harlan argued, however, that the actual malice test overprotected the
media's first amendment rights to the detriment of the public figure
who is not a public official.38 He urged that in such cases the actual
malice test should be replaced by a standard based on highly unreason-
able conduct. 39 He explained that "an extreme departure from the
standards of investigation and reporting ordinarily adhered to by
responsible publishers" would constitute such conduct.40
In the same year, the Court decided Time, Inc. v. Hill.41 For the
first time the Court dealt with a case involving a "private figure"
plaintiff. The plaintiff claimed relief based on a violation of a New
York privacy statute rather than libel.42 He alleged that a magazine
34. See, e.g., Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130, 170 (1967) (Black and
Douglas, JJ., concurring and dissenting); Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc., 403 U.S. 29,
57 (1971) (Black, J., concurring); Gertz v. Robert Welch, 418 U.S. 323, 355 (1974)
(Douglas, J., dissenting). Although there were separate opinions filed in Firestone, not
one of them advocated that absolute privilege against defamation actions be afforded
to the news media. Those justices who would have, in New York Times v. Sullivan,
established such a test, see note 26 supra and accompanying text, are no longer on the
Court. Their successors (with the possible exception of Justice Stevens, who did not
participate in the Firestone decision) are of a different persuasion, not giving such
great weight to first amendment considerations.
35. 388 U.S. 130 (1967).
36. Justice Harlan announced the Court's decision and delivered an opinion in
which Justices Clark, Stewart, and Fortas joined. In a separate opinion, Chief Justice
Warren concurred in the result but on different grounds. Justice Black, joined by
Justice Douglas, concurred in part and dissented in part; Justice Brennan, joined by
Justice White, likewise concurred in part and dissented in part.
37. Id. at 154-55.
38. Id. at 155.
39. Id.
40. Id.
41. 385 U.S. 374 (1967).
42. This case is an example of the so-called "false light" invasion of privacy. "[T]he
right claimed is to be free from the publication of false or misleading information
about one's affairs .... ." Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469, 490 (1975).
Although the Court relied upon a first amendment analysis, it has continually attempted
to distinguish those cases involving defamation and those involving false light invasion
MEDIA LIABILITY
article falsely reported that a new play portrayed an experience suffered
by plaintiff and his family when held hostage by escaped convicts.
Justice Brennan, writing for a majority of five, held that, since truth
was a complete defense in actions under the New York right-to-
privacy law if based upon reports of newsworthy people or events,"
then the constitutional protections for speech and press required the
application of the New York Times standard.4 4 Therefore, since the
play was a newsworthy event, the Court held the plaintiff must meet
the actual malice test despite plaintiff's status as a private figure.45
Justice Harlan, in dissent, argued that in cases involving private figures,
the federal constitutional limits would be met if the jury, on retrial,
should find only negligent, rather than reckless or knowing, falsity in
the publication of the article.46
The Court's continual expansion of the scope of the New York
Times test in these early cases seemed to support predictions that the
nature of the events reported would replace the status of persons
reported upon as the controlling determinant for invocation of the
stricter actual malice test.4 7 A move by the Court toward absolute
privilege from liability, espoused by the minority in New York Times
v. Sullivan, seemed imminent. With the continual expansion of New
York Times there was little discussion of damages in these early cases
since the Court continually required that the actual malice standard
must be met before any damages-whether actual, presumed, or puni-
tive-could be recovered.
In Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc., 4  the Court was faced with
another opportunity for expansion of the New York Times privilege.
The case involved a magazine distributor, a private individual, who
sued a radio station because of two sets of defamatory newscasts. The
first set of broadcasts, which pertained to the distributor's arrest by
police for possession of obscene literature, failed at one point to
describe the books as "allegedly" or "reportedly" obscene. In the re-
of privacy. See also Cantrell v. Forest City Publishing Co., 419 U.S. 245 (1974). However,
at least one commentator has noted:
There has been a good deal of overlapping of defamation in the false light
cases, and it seems clear that either action, or both, will very often lie. . . . [T]he
question may well be raised, and is still unanswered, whether this branch of the
tort is not capable of swallowing up and engulfing the whole law of defamation.
W. PROSSER, supra note 19, § 117, at 813.
43. 385 U.S. at 383.
44. Id. at 387-88.
45. Id. at 390.
46. Id. at 410.
47. See, e.g., Kalven, The Reasonable Man and the First Amendment: Hill, Butts,
and Walker, 1967 Sup. CT. REv. 267.
48. 403 U.S. 29 (1971).
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sulting trial the books were found not to be obscene. The second set of
broadcasts labelled the plaintiffs of a pending court action, of which
the magazine distributor was a party, as "smut distributors" or "girlie-
book peddlers."
Once again, in Rosenbloom as in Time Inc. v. Hill, Justices
Brennan and Harlan were at odds over the appropriate liability
standard to be applied in cases involving private individual plaintiffs
and the press. Although the Court eventually applied the New York
Times standard to the facts of the case, Justice Brennan was unable
to persuade a majority of the Court to establish the actual malice
test as the proper standard to be applied in all cases implicating the
press which involved a subject of public or general interest. Justice
Brennan again emphasized that, irrespective of who may be inad-
vertently defamed, the first amendment interests in free speech re-
quired that the press be afforded the New York Times protection in
order to foster public debate49 and prevent press self-censorship.50
Brennan reasoned, "[i]f a matter is a subject of public or general interest,
it cannot suddenly become less so merely because a private individual
is involved, or because in some sense the individual did not 'volun-
tarily' choose to become involved."'51
Justice Harlan, in dissent, argued that a private person-one who
has not sought publicity and who would have little access to the media
for rebuttal-deserves a greater degree of protection than does a public
figure.5 2 He once again urged that this greater protection would best
be implemented by the use of a reasonable care negligence standard.53
Justice Harlan noted, however, that under a negligence standard, a
private figure plaintiff should be compensated only for actual, measur-
able harm which was reasonably foreseeable as a result of the publica-
tion.5 4 Only when actual malice is proved should punitive damages
be allowed, provided they bear a reasonable "relation to the actual
damages awarded .... .55 Justices Marshall and Stewart, in a separate
joint dissent, concurred with the Harlan position.56 Additionally,
Justices Marshall and Stewart would not permit the recovery of pre-
sumed or punitive damages under any standard in cases involving
private individuals.5 7 They argued that only damages for proved,
49. Id. at 42-43.
50. Id. at 50.
51. Id. at 43.
52. Id. at 70.
53. Id. at 72.
54. Id. at 66.
* 55. Id. at 75.
56. Id. at 78.
57. Id. at 83-84.
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actual injuries could be recovered since "the self-censorship that re-
sults from the uncertainty created by the discretion as well as the
self-censorship resulting from the fear of large judgments themselves
would be reduced." 58 Justice Brennan found the rationale underlying
the dissenters' position to be "at best, a legal fiction." 59 Furthermore,
he noted that the distinction between public figures and private in-
dividuals could produce paradoxical results. For example, open dis-
cussion of an issue of public or general concern might be restrained
merely because it involved a private citizen, while discussion of aspects
of the lives of public figures not in the area of public concern would
be extended constitutional protection. 0
Nevertheless, in 1974, Justice Harlan's Rosenbloom view was
adopted by five justices in Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc.61 In Gertz an
attorney sued for defamatory publication of an article that falsely de-
scribed him as a communist and an architect of a "frame-up" of a
police officer convicted of murder. Justice Powell, writing for the
majority, rejected Justice Brennan's position in Rosenbloom and re-
turned the focus in defamation cases from subject matter to the public
figure/private figure dichotomy. He stated that the first amendment
protection afforded the news media against defamation suits by public
figures should not be extended to defamation suits by private persons,
even though the defamatory statements regard an issue of public or
general interest.6 2 Powell found instead that, so long as states "do not
impose liability without fault, [they] may define for themselves the
appropriate standard of liability for a publisher or broadcaster of de-
famatory falsehood injurious to a private individual. ' ' 6 3
In Gertz, the Court recognized two classes of public figures who
must still meet the New York Times standard before recovering dam-
ages for libel against the news media. 64 First, there are those in-
dividuals who "occupy positions of such persuasive power and in-
fluence that they are deemed public figures for all purposes." 65 Second,
and more commonly, there are those individuals who "have thrust
themselves to the forefront of particular public controversies in order
to influence the resolution of the issues involved."66 Thus, an in-
dividual in the latter class can be a public figure for some purposes
58. Id.
59. Id. at 48.
60. Id.
61. 4.18 U.S. 323 (1974).
62. Id. at 345-46.
63. Id. at 347 (footnote omitted).
64. Id. at 345.
65. Id.
66. Id.
1977]
456 FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol.5:446
and a private figure for others. This latter public figure classification
depends on two determinations. Before finding that a plaintiff is a
public figure, a court must first find that the plaintiff has thrust him-
self to the forefront of a particular controversy in order to influence
the resolution of the issues involved, and second, that the controversy
is a public controversy. 67
In the Court's opinion, the public figure test was not only more
appropriate with respect to first amendment considerations than the
Rosenbloom subject matter test, but it was also easier to administer. 68
The Court explained that the test advanced in Rosenbloom "would
occasion the ... difficulty of forcing state and federal judges to decide
on an ad hoc basis which publications address issues of 'general or
public interest' and which do not-to determine . . . 'what informa-
tion is relevant to self-government.' "69 The Court doubted the wisdom
of committing this task to the conscience of judges.7 0
Justice Powell did not detail his analysis of Mr. Gertz's status
under the new public figure definition. He merely stated that he had
no difficulty in distinguishing between public and private figure
plaintiffs7 1 and declared that Gertz was a private figure plaintiff.72
However, Justice Powell did say that "[i]t is preferable to reduce the
public figure question to a more meaningful context by looking to
the nature and extent of an individual's participation in the particular
controversy giving rise to the defamation."73 Yet this declaration seems
to combine the public figure test with the subject matter test. Finally,
Justice Powell stated that, under this rationale, only actual, proven
damages could be recovered under the lower standard. 7 All claims
for presumed or punitive damages must still meet the actual malice
standard. 5
More recently, in Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn76 the Court
was faced with another invasion-of-privacy case implicating the first
amendment. The plaintiff, a private figure, was the father of a
seventeen-year-old deceased rape victim. He sued a television station
for invasion of privacy when his daughter's identity was obtained from
official court records and subsequently broadcast. Plaintiff grounded
67. Id.
68. Id. at 346.
69. Id. (citation omitted).
70. Id.
71. Id. at 344.
72. Id. at 352.
73. Id.
74. ld. at 350.
75. id. at 349.
76. 420 U.S. 469 (1975).
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his cause of action on a Georgia criminal statute making it a mis-
demeanor to publish or broadcast the name or identity of any rape
victim. The Court held that, absent a showing that the name was
obtained in an improper fashion or that it was not in an official court
document open to public inspection, the first amendment would not
allow exposing the press to liability for truthfully publishing informa-
tion released to the public in official court records. 77
In Cox the Court emphasized its long-held belief that broad press
coverage of governmental functions, particularly judicial functions,
provides significant contributions to society's ability to vote intelli-
gently and to register opinions on the administration of government
generally. 7 The Court also noted that the press serves to guarantee
the fairness of trials and brings to bear the beneficial effects of public
scrutiny upon the administration of justice.79 The Court did not
seem to consider the status of the plaintiff (either as a private or
public figure) to be relevant to its holding.8 The decision appeared
to suggest that perhaps the Court in Gertz had not entirely overruled
the Rosenbloom subject matter test in those cases which, while touch-
ing a private figure plaintiff, involved reports of governmental pro-
ceedings relevant to society's ability to self-govern and thus heavily
implicated the first amendment.
In Firestone, the Court clarified the operation and scope of the
Gertz doctrine. The Court, for the first time, detailed its analysis of
a libel plaintiff under the public figure test. The analysis and its
implications are revealing. Justice Rehnquist, writing for a five-justice
majority, stated that Ms. Firestone had not assumed any role of
special prominence in the affairs of society.8' In other words, Ms. Fire-
stone's status did not warrant her inclusion in the first classification of
Gertz's public figures, which includes only those persons who are
public figures for all purposes. The Court then went on to find that
Ms. Firestone had not thrust herself to the forefront of any particular
controversy 8 2 and, thus, was not a public figure under the second Gertz
classification. The Court added that the dissolution of a marriage
through judicial proceedings was not to be considered a public con-
troversy as referred to in Gertz.8 3
77. Id. at 496.
78. Id. at 491-92.
79. Id. at 492.
80. Id. at 491-92.
81. 424 U.S. at 453.
82. 424 U.S. at 453-55. Even though Ms. Firestone held several press conferences
during the divorce proceedings, the majority did not believe that this exposure was
indicative of public figure status. Id. at 454-55 n.3.
83. Id. at 454.
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Despite the Court's sparse treatment of this last point, it appears
that the Gertz public controversy determination is little more than
a variation of the rejected Rosenbloom subject matter test. Yet, as
previously noted, the Court in Gertz had considered the Rosenbloom
subject matter determination to be difficult to administer and had
doubted the wisdom of committing such a task to the courts. But, as
Firestone demonstrates, the Court has now included a similar subject
matter determination in a far more complicated public figure test.84
If the Rosenbloom test, which required only one determination as
to whether the offending news report was of public or general interest,
was difficult to apply, how much more difficult to apply will be the
far more complex public figure test? The flow to the public of in-
formation pertinent to self-government must still depend in many
instances on a post facto, ad hoc determination by the judiciary as to
what controversial events are to be characterized as essentially public
in nature and thus entitled to the New York Times privilege (i.e., the
actual malice test). The Court supplies the press with little or no
guidance.
In fact, the present public figure test introduces even more un-
certainty into the law of libel with which the news media must
contend in its everyday operation.8 5 Furthermore, because of the un-
certainty generated by the ad hoc public figure determination, the
possibility exists that any individual, save perhaps a public official,
may be able to avail himself of the lower negligence standard in
84. Even Justice Marshall, an early supporter of the Gertz public figure test, con-
cluded, in dissent, that Ms. Firestone was a public figure under a Gertz analysis. 424 U.S.
at 490. He stated that:
The only explanation I can discern from the Court's opinion is that the con-
troversy was not of the sort deemed relevant to the "affairs of society," . . . and
the public's interest not of the sort deemed "legitimate" or worthy of judicial
recognition.
If there is one thing that is clear from Gertz, it is that we explicitly rejected
the position of the plurality in Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc., 403 U.S. 29 (1971),
that the applicability of the New York Times standard depends upon whether
the subject matter of a report is a matter of "public or general concern." . . .
Having thus rejected the appropriateness of judicial inquiry into "the legitimacy
of interest in a particular event or subject," Rosenbloom, 403 U.S. at 78-79 (Marshall,
J., dissenting), Gertz obviously did not intend to sanction any such inquiry by
its use of the term "public controversy." Yet that is precisely how I understand
the Court's opinion to interpret Gertz.
If Gertz is to have any meaning at all, the focus of analysis must be on the
actions of the individual, and the degree of public attention that had already
developed, or that could have been anticipated, before the report in question.
Id. at 487-89 (footnote omitted) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
85. The introduction of the negligence standard into the law of libel has also
been criticized. See, e.g., The Supreme Court, 1973 Term, 88 HARV. L. REv. 43, 147-48
(1974).
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attempting to establish liability for libel against the press. This
possibility may encourage libel plaintiffs to pursue questionable claims
in anticipation of large damage awards sometimes associated with libel
cases.s6 Even if the press won all libel actions, the specter of defending
against them may well prove to be as potent a force for self-censorship
as any threat of an actual damage award.8 7
The Court in Firestone has unnecessarily exacerbated the spurious
litigation threat by allowing juries to award to private figures large,
substantially unproven damages based merely on the negligence
standard. The Court recognized that Ms. Firestone's $100,000 damage
award is permissible if negligence is ultimately established, even
though the award was premised entirely on the highly speculative
injury of mental pain and anguish and not on harm to her reputa-
tion.88 "But to allow such damages without proof 'by competent evi-
dence' of any other 'actual injury' is to do nothing less than return to
the old rule of presumed damages supposedly outlawed by Gertz in
instances where the New York Times standard is not met."89 It would
appear that by allowing this type of recovery the states can subvert
whatever protection the "actual injury" stricture may afford 0 Again,
this result is contrary to the Court's intentions as stated in Gertz. There
the Court stressed that private figures could recover only proven, actual
damages under a negligence standard; presumed or punitive damages
could be awarded only if the actual malice standard were met.91 This
rationale recognized a long-held belief of the Court that the jury's
ability to award presumed or punitive damages clearly invites gratu-
86. For instance, in Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130 (1967), a jury
awarded former University of Georgia athletic director, Wally Butts, $3,000,000 punitive
and $60,000 general damages (reduced by the trial court to a total of $460,000). In
Goldwater v. Ginzburg, 414 F.2d 324 (2d Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 1049 (1970),
Senator Goldwater won $75,000 in punitive damages from Ralph Ginzburg and his
magazine even though the jury found that Goldwater had suffered only nominal com-
pensatory damages of one dollar.
87. Time, Inc. v. Firestone, 424 U.S. 448, 475 n.3 (Brennan, J., dissenting). See
also Anderson, Libel and Press Self-Censorship, 53 TEX L. REv. 422 477 (1975).
88. 424 U.S. at 460-61 (Opinion of the Court); id. at 475 n.3 (Brennan, J., dissent-
ing). See Eaton, The American Law of Defamation Through Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc.
and Beyond: An Analytical Primer, 61 VA. L. REv. 1349, 1436-39 (1975), suggesting
that such an approach could work a fundamental change in the tort itself. Historically,
injury to reputation has been the essence of libel; if damages are allowed in the
absence of injury to reputation, then "the insult, not the injury, is the cause of
action .... Id. at 1437. Added the author, "There is real mischief here." id. at 1438.
89. 424 U.S. at 475 n.3 (Brennan, J., dissenting); see Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc.,
418 U.S. at 348-50.
90. Time, Inc. v. Firestone, 424 U.S. at 475 n.3. (Brennan, J., dissenting).
91. 418 U.S. at 349-50.
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itous awards of money damages which are far in excess of any actual
injury and also facilitates jury punishment of unpopular opinions.9 2
The Firestone decision should cause concern for freedom of the
press in the United States. Because many smaller press institutions
will be unable or unwilling to defend against increased libel litiga-
tion,9" and because many cost-conscious organizations are wont to
avoid a lawsuit, the press is apt to censor itself, effecting a curtail-
ment of its broad coverage of newsworthy events. Thus, the realm of
extensive, intrepid journalism will be restricted to those media institu-
tions which are able and willing to bear the cost of libel litigation as
an operational expense.9 4 To the extent that the Gertz doctrine cur-
tails the general flow of information pertinent to society's ability to
self-govern, the Gertz doctrine is repugnant to the first amendment.
Moreover, the Court in Firestone refused to recognize the need
for any first-amendment-based exception to the Gertz doctrine. The
Court appeared unwilling to address itself to the basic practicalities
which face the news media in the performance of its first amendment
functions. For example, the Court refused to consider the proposition
that there is no meaningful way to report governmental proceedings
without reference to those persons and transactions, regardless of their
status as private or public, which form the subject matter of the pro-
ceedings. 95 Without exceptions for investigative reporting, most broad-
92. Id. at 349.
93. The editor of the Nation has described how libel law affects his magazine:
Another limitation is the libel laws, which, although they have been somewhat
relaxed, still warn publications-particularly small circulation publications-away
from important subject matter. It has been my experience that individuals and
corporations will threaten-and actually sue-small journals of opinions when
they would hesitate to threaten or sue the New York Times for the same material.
On occasion I have arranged for authors to testify before Congressional com-
mittees to get stories before the public simply because a publication such as the
Nation cannot afford the luxury of winning a libel action. About a year ago we
were sued and the case was thrown out-but it cost us $7500 to win.
McWilliams, Is Muckraking Coming Back?, 9 COLUM. JOURNALISM REV. 8, 15 (1970).
The cost of defending a full fledged libel suit like Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc.,
403 U.S. 29 (1971) can run as high as $100,000. Ek, Libel Insurance, in NELSON & TEETER,
LAw OF MASS COMMUNICATIONS 666, 678 app. D (2d ed. 1973).
94. The most notable example of a journalist who considered libel litigation a
cost of doing business was the late columnist Drew Pearson. His attorney estimated that
Pearson and the journals that carried his column were sued for libel approximately
275 times for amounts totalling over $200,000,000. Pearson lost only one suit, but spent
"hundreds of thousands of dollars in legal fees" to defend against these claims. 0. PILAT,
DREw PEARSON:. AN UNAUTHORIZED BIOGRAPHY, 10, 15 (1973).
95. 424 U.S. at 476-77 (Brennan, J., dissenting); cf. Rosenbloom v. Metromedia,
Inc., 403 U.S. at 61 (White, J., concurring) (discussion of conduct of public officials
should not be subjected to artificial limitations designed to protect others involved
in an episode with officials from unfavorable publicity).
MEDIA LIABILITY
casters and publishers can attempt to avoid liability without incon-
venience simply by ceasing to carry materials that could create the
risk of liability.9 6 The result of such self-censorship must be a reduction
of the flow of information to the public.
The legacy of Firestone may be further erosion of public trust in
American government. Firestone will likely affect the degree to which
the operations of the judiciary are exposed to public scrutiny.97 This
possible reduction in public exposure of the judicial branch of the
government may well be viewed with a great deal of skepticism by
the American public. Withholding or only partial disclosure of details
of official action frequently results in public distrust.'8
The present Court, in its effort to provide private figure plaintiffs
with a remedy for news media defamation, has developed a doctrine
in conflict with the dictates of the first amendment and with the best
interest of American society. But the Court is not without practical
alternate remedies for the private figure plaintiff that are more com-
patible with the demands of these competing interests. For example,
although the Supreme Court in Miami Herald Publishing Co. v.
Tornillon dealt an apparent deathblow to "right-to-reply" statutes,
the possibility of paid rebuttal advertisements remains. 1°° A more
efficient and economical alternative, however, would be adoption
of retraction statutes which would require public retraction (without
an assessment of damages) for those private-figure plaintiffs able to
prove defamatory falsehood 10 1 In his concurring opinion in Torn illo,10 2
Justice Brennan illustrated that such a retraction statute, even when
affording relief on a strict liability basis, would not violate current
constitutional prohibitions. Another possible solution would be a
declaratory judgment statute which would provide for fact-finding
and vindication, but no compensation. These remedies could be
joined with an award of court costs and attorney's fees in appropriate
cases. Finally, a combination of these alternatives, coupled with a
return to the Rosenbloom subject matter test as the standard for
money damages may best serve the interests of the defamed and the
defamer as well as society and the constitution. This would, in effect,
provide the press with enough freedom to adequately perform its
96. See Anderson, supra note 87, at 432 n.52.
97. 424 U.S. at 476-78 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
98. Green, The Right to Communicate, 35 N.Y.U. L. REV. 903, 909-10 (1960).
99. 418 U.S. 241 (1974).
100. See The Supreme Court, 1973 Term, supra note 85, at 180.
101. See Comment, Reply and Retraction in Actions Against the Press for Defamq.
tion: The Effect of Tornillo and Gertz, 43 FORDHAM L. REV. 223 (1974).
102. 418 U.S. at 258 (Brennan, J., joined by Rehnquist, J., concurring),
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necessary first amendment functions and yet still provide the private
figure plaintiff with an adequate remedy. However, it would not have
the chilling impact of present first amendment law.
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